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Gene Transfer for Pain: 
A tool to cope with the intractable, or an unethical endurance-
enhancing technology? 
 
S. CAMPORESI1 AND M. J. McNAMEE2 
Introduction 
In this paper we consider two plausible scenarios in which an individual is seeking 
treatment with gene transfer tools to cope better with pain. In the first scenario the 
individual is a patient; in the second an athlete. The general question explored is 
whether it is ethically justifiable for the individual to seek an experimental gene 
transfer treatment in order to raise his/her tolerance to pain. We employ here a 
comparative strategy to highlight the similarities and dissimilarities between the 
ethical frameworks used to evaluate the two scenarios, and to reach conclusions 
regarding the justifiability of the potential practice. 
Gene transfer for pain 
Untreatable pain represents an enormous problem to society. As estimated by current 
statistics, approximately 20 per cent of the adult population suffers from chronic pain, 
and the financial cost to society is estimated at more than €200 billion per annum in 
Europe, and $150 billion per annum in the USA3. Treatment options are limited, with 
many patients either not responding to them or having incomplete pain reduction.4 
 
In the last decade, several translational clinical trials have been carried out that 
employed gene transfer tools to try to overcome this medical need. Gene transfer trials 
certainly qualify as translational trials, as they are designed to bring to the bedside the 
tools developed at the bench of a molecular biology laboratory. We performed a 
search with keywords ‘gene transfer’ and ‘pain’ on the National Health Institutes 
clinical trials directory, which revealed 20 clinical trials that are either completed or in 
recruitment.5 To date nine clinical trials have been completed.6 Some of these trials 
are aimed at treating intractable cancer pain, some at treating pain associated with 
angina pectoris, others at epidermolysis bullosa (a heritable condition where 
connective tissue disease causes painful blisters in the skin and mucosal membranes), 
and others to treat the pain associated with peripheral arterial occlusion (a mini-stroke 
in the leg which causes the necrosis of muscular tissue leading to impaired 
functionality and chronic pain). This last kind of pain, and the related clinical trial, 
serves as a case study for our comparative evaluation between a medical context and a 
sports context, where the former is a traditionally conceived therapeutic intervention, 
and the latter is one where the intervention rests in the grey zone between therapy and 
enhancement – or as it has been labelled, therapeutic enhancement.7 We set out the 
two scenarios below and evaluate them ethically according to two different 
frameworks. 
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Scenario a): The medical context (the patient) 
In scenario a), in the US TV series House MD the protagonist, Dr Gregory House, has 
suffered from peripheral ischemia to a leg, which has left him limping and with 
intractable chronic pain, due to the extensive necrotic muscular tissue in his thigh 
muscles. He is seeking an alternative solution in a gene transfer clinical trial. Dr 
House can perhaps be seen as a contemporary instance of the archetypical 
mythological figure of the “wounded healer” Chiron, who is able to heal others but 
unable to heal himself. After having tried many standard and less standard treatments 
unsuccessfully, our protagonist is now seeking experimental treatments, i.e. 
treatments that are currently being tested in clinical trials and not yet approved by 
national regulatory bodies such as the US Food & Drug Administration (FDA) or the 
European Medicines Agency (EMA), and are unavailable on the market. Among the 
gene transfer trials currently active or recruiting, one study stands out as the perfect 
match for a patient like Gregory House. 
  
The trial (Identifier # NCT00304837’)8 is a Phase 1 study that seeks to transfer the 
DNA codifying for the Vascular Endothelial Growth Factor (VEGF) protein into the 
legs of patients with peripheral artery disease (PAD). PAD encompasses a range of 
conditions presenting with blockages in the arteries in the limbs. The nature of the 
disease is progressive, so that it frequently leads to patients presenting with 
claudication or critical limb ischemia (CLI).9 It is this former manifestation of PAD 
that we are interested to discuss.  Most Phase 1 studies are aimed at testing the safety 
of a new pharmaceutical or treatment in a restricted number of patients, after the 
treatment has proved efficacious in laboratory testing and animal models, but some –
like this one - may also test the efficacy of the agent under study. According to the 
trial protocol, the DNA codifying for the VEGF protein is injected into the affected 
legs of the trial subjects on three separate occasions, each two weeks apart. The DNA 
codifier then directs the cells of the artery wall to increase production of VEGF, 
which has been shown to cause new blood vessels to grow around the blockages in the 
leg arteries.10 It has also been demonstrated that increased VEGF expression through 
gene transfer techniques improves microcirculation in muscle, and hence increased 
oxygen and nutrient supply, as well as removal of waste products.11 Kim et al have 
observed evidence of growth of new collateral vessels, relief of ischemic pain and 
ulcer healing in patients with CLI.12 The trial we are analysing aims not only to test 
the safety of VEGF-gene transfer, but also to relieve pain and/or heal the ulcers 
caused by PAD.13 
 
Generally speaking, safety concerns about gene transfer are related both to the kind of 
carrier/vector being used (usually a modified virus) and to the encoded transgene. In 
our case study, the former are eliminated by injecting the DNA coding for the VEGF 
protein directly into the patients’ leg muscles, without any viral or non-viral carrier, 
thus eliminating the risks inherent in the vectors and common to many other gene 
transfer trials. As to the latter risks, it has been shown that overexpression of VEGF 
causes haemangiomas (benign tumours characterised by an increased number of 
normal or abnormal vessels filled with blood) in skeletal muscle in mouse animal 
models.14 In addition, angiogenesis, can have detrimental consequences in non-target 
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tissues. In particular, the theoretical risk of facilitation of tumour vascularization (and 
therefore, increased growth) or plaque angiogenesis in non-target tissues must not be 
ignored.15 Transient peripheral edema (swelling) due to increased local perfusion is a 
relatively common and mild side effect. 
 
More serious adverse effects have been rarely observed and are mostly related to the 
use of viral vectors, therefore are not pertinent to the trial we are discussing which 
injects DNA in the form of a plasmid (a circular molecule of DNA).16 A recent study 
conducted by Muona et al and aimed at assessing the long-term side effects (10+ 
years) of local VEGF gene transfer to ischemic lower limbs found that adenovirus or 
plasmid (our case) or liposome mediated intravascular local gene transfer does not 
increase the risk of malignancies, diabetes or any other disease in the long term. The 
authors also identified as a key element to safe gene transfer the local delivery to the 
treatment side (as in our case), which reduced the risk of systematic spread of the 
vector, as well of adverse side-effects to other organs. This suggests that the technique 
described here could be safely applied both in trial subjects and in healthy individuals 
(which is pertinent to Scenario b), below).17 
 
As noted by Mughal et al,18 PAD cannot be attributed to one specific genetic cause, 
and greater therapeutic efficacy could be obtained by targeted gene transfer using 
multiple growth factors. Indeed, angiogenic gene transfer strategies such as VEGF-
gene transfer are by no means the only ones being explored in the treatment of chronic 
pain19 but appear to be among the most advanced at the clinical level, while other 
strategies are still at the level of animal studies. As a general remark, while we are 
aware that a certain degree of speculation is necessary when applying our case study 
to the second scenario (the elite sports context), we think there is sufficient scientific 
and medical evidence to argue that gene transfer for pain has very plausible 
applications for enhancing athletic performances. 
Scenario b): The sports context (the elite athlete) 
In scenario b), the would-be protagonist is an elite athlete competing in an endurance 
event, such as cross-country skiing, marathon running, tour cycling, triathlon, or an 
event of similar extended duration, seeking VEGF-gene transfer in order to cope 
better with the pain inherent in the event as a primary outcome, and as a secondary 
outcome to perform better as a result. The growth of blood vessels in the limbs, as 
demonstrated by the clinical trial described above, is likely to aid the athlete in his/her 
performance by increasing the oxygen-carrying capacity to the limbs (nutrient supply) 
and the removal of waste products.  
 
It is also obvious that an athlete feeling less pain could perform better, ceteribus 
paribus, than other athletes experiencing a greater degree of pain.  
Comparing the scenarios 
How are we to understand the similarities and differences these contexts present, and 
to what extent will the context determine whether it is ethically justifiable for an 
individual to seek an experimental gene transfer treatment better to cope with pain? 
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To what extent is the ethical permissibility of the practice dependent upon or 
independent of the context of gene transfer? We respond to these questions by 
spelling out two ethical frameworks that might be adopted in order to analyse the two 
scenarios. 
Framework a): Ethics of translational research 
With a few relevant exclusions,20 we do not normally regard pain as an essential or 
valuable part of our lives. On the contrary, we take measures to diminish or even 
eliminate pain from our daily lives, and from the lives of those who are dear to us. 
Even in illnesses where pain is present, we try to eliminate it, although it may not be 
possible to cure the patient of the underlying cause. Palliative care, which we consider 
an essential part of treating a sick human being with dignity, is predicated on such an 
understanding. 
 
The first framework we use to analyse the scenarios is the ‘ethics of translational 
research’ approach recently developed by Kimmelman.21 Kimmelman develops the 
new concept of ‘translational distance’, which refers to the space created between 
cutting-edge biomedical research and clinical applications. It may not be possible in 
the first in-human studies to apply the concept of ‘clinical equipoise’, defined by 
Friedman as “a state of honest, professional disagreement in the community of experts 
about the preferred treatment”.22 The level of uncertainty is so high in first-in-human 
research employing gene transfer techniques that robust epistemic thresholds required 
for clinical equipoise cannot be secured. In its place, the concept of translational 
distance is a useful and insightful kind of ‘epistemic heuristics’ to understand the 
bidirectional flow of knowledge between the bench and the bedside.  
 
While traditionally the value of early clinical trials has been regarded only in terms of 
their ‘progressive value’ towards later Phase 2 and Phase 3 studies, such a framework 
is not applicable when evaluating the social value of first-in-human research as in our 
case study. In Kimmelman’s model, Phase 1 translational studies in between the 
‘bench and the bedside’ are loaded with value if they stimulate preclinical research or 
if they stimulate further clinical development. In addition, adopting a translational 
distance model with a non-progressive epistemic value for these trials would help to 
dispel the ‘therapeutic misconception’23 widespread among (often desperate) first-in 
clinical trials volunteers. Therapeutic misconception arises where subjects 
misinterpret the primary purpose of a clinical trial as therapeutic, and conflate the 
goals of research with the goals of clinical care. As shown in a study of consent 
documents of gene transfer clinical trials, 20 per cent of consent documents for gene 
transfer trials fail to explain their purpose as establishing safety and dosage, while 
only 41 per cent of oncology trials identify palliative care as an alternative to 
participation. Moreover, the term gene therapy is used with twice the frequency of the 
term gene transfer..24 
 
As defined by Kimmelman, the concept of translational distance “is intended to 
prompt researchers, review committees, and policy-makers to contemplate the size of 
the ‘inferential gap’ separating completed preclinical studies and projected human 
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trial results”,25 and should inform both the design of the studies (that need to 
incorporate endpoints that make it possible for the knowledge produced to have an 
impact in terms of further research), and the ethical approval of the trial, that needs to 
take into account the concept of translational distance rather than that of clinical 
equipoise. We agree with Kimmelman that the translational research model better 
captures the reality of how information flows in translational research. As for the 
individual seeking to be enrolled in such an experimental trial, we recommend that 
researchers spell out the potential risks and benefits of the experimental procedure to 
the would-be volunteer; researchers should evaluate the severity of the pre-existing 
condition in the subject and its refractoriness to other standard treatment; and they 
should evaluate the subject’s decisional autonomy, which will be predicated on 
reasonable comprehension (and voluntariness) in relation to the foregoing.  
 
Returning to our fictional protagonist, we can see that in this particular case the risks 
inherent in gene transfer trials due to the viral vectors are eliminated by injecting 
VEGF directly into the leg muscles of the patients, and therefore the translational 
distance between the bench and the bedside can also be considered a modest 
‘inferential gap’. In addition, the pre-existing condition of chronic pain caused by 
peripheral artery ischemia is severe and refractory to standard treatment. And finally, 
Dr Gregory House seems to be in a position to make an autonomous decision, one not 
clouded by therapeutic misconception. As autonomy plays a fundamental role in the 
ethical framework describing the medical context, there would need to be strong 
reasons to justify interference with the patient’s self-regarding and autonomous choice 
to participate in the trial, even recognising as we do that the patient may have no 
available option (apart from palliative care) other than participating in the trial, due to 
the severity of his condition and the unavailability of therapeutic options. Provided all 
the above conditions were met, we might reasonably reach the conclusion that his 
informed consent to participating in the VEGF-clinical trial would be valid. 
Framework b): Ethics of sports enhancement 
How should we frame the request of an athlete seeking VEGF-gene transfer for the 
purposes of better coping with pain during a competition? In the first instance, his 
participation might look like a case of what we could call ‘physician-assisted doping’.  
 
The World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA) sets out three criteria used in the decision 
to call a product or process ‘doping’.26 These pertain to (i) the (potential) 
performance-enhancing effects; (ii) the potential harm to health; the (potential) health 
risks. Only two criteria need apply for a product or process to be prohibited. The Anti-
Doping Code recognises the rights of athletes to secure healthcare and that this right 
supersedes anti-doping regulations. This does not, however, allow the patient-athlete 
carte blanche. Prior to utilising banned products or processes athletes on a registered 
testing pool (who are on notice that they may be randomly tested) must submit a 
Therapeutic Use Exemption (TUE) Certificate signed by a relevant medical authority. 
This certifies that the therapy is necessary for the athlete’s condition and that no non-
doping alternative is available. Clearly, the process is open to abuse. Moreover, in 
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Paralympic sport, where elite athletes have at least one disabling condition, the 
problem is even more complex.27 
 
Leaving aside for the present the added complexities of unethical behaviour, let us 
assume that the athlete is asking for a TUE from the relevant authority. In addition to 
the World Anti-Doping Agency, this might be an International Federation, such as the 
International Association of Athletics Federations (IAAF), or the Union Cycliste 
International, or the International Triathlon Union, or an event organiser such as the 
International Olympic Committee (IOC) or the International Paralympic Committee, 
who (interestingly) take exclusive charge of in-competition testing during the 
Olympic and Paralympic Games. There is very little to suggest that a TUE would be 
achievable in this scenario. Despite TUE precedents for beta-blockers in relation to 
cardiac patient-athletes in target-accuracy events (such as archery), it is highly 
unlikely that it would be given for mere pain relief where that pain is simply a marker 
for injury (and where there may be performance enhancement side effects). The 
deputy director of the World Anti Doping Laboratory in Cologne, widely recognised 
as one of the premier testing laboratories, recently remarked upon the practice of 
using analgesics as analogous to doping: 
 
"It is a grey zone. In my opinion pain killers fulfil all requirements of 
a doping substance because normally pain is a protection mechanism 
of the body and with pain killers you switch of this protection 
system."28 
 
Given the longstanding routine use and abuse of painkillers in elite sport29, 30, 31 it 
might be argued that the introduction of VEGF would represent merely an extension 
of everyday practice. In both the first and also in this second scenario, consideration 
would have to be given to the autonomy of the decision-making of the individual in 
arriving at ethically justifiable interventions. In the second scenario this would be 
thought necessary, while in the first scenario this might be thought both necessary and 
sufficient, provided that the conditions for a modest translational distance were met, 
as they are in our case-study. Why then is it insufficient in the context of elite sports? 
Well, in addition to determining the conditions of consent, additional factors 
regarding the ethical permissibility of VEGF-gene transfer in an athletic context must 
be considered, 
 
In contrast to scenario a), pain can be seen as an essential, integral part of endurance 
sports. Performing at an elite level in endurance sport and not experiencing pain are 
mutually exclusive. Indeed, an athlete’s ability to tolerate pain is one of the 
fundamental characteristics that determine athletic performance and provide 
competitive advantage. Five-times Tour de France winner Lance Armstrong called the 
event “an exercise in pointless suffering”.32 He and others have talked insightfully 
about wanting to take opponents (metaphorically) to places that they could not endure. 
The capacity to endure high levels of pain over significant time (ie suffering) is a 
highly prized trait in multi-day/week Tour event cycling.33  Indeed one may refer to 
them as “communities of suffering”.34 
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Not only is it the case that we must distinguish the experience of pain from suffering35 
in sports36 but in addition there are, of course, different kinds of pain an athlete can 
experience in competition.37 One is the acute kind that can be defined as an intense 
and specific pain that occurs suddenly, often a result of injury, often experienced by 
athletes competing in football or other contact sports. Moreover, one can experience 
such pain in endurance events too – the cycle crash, the herniated disc in running, and 
so on. VEGF-gene transfer treatment would be meaningless for this kind of pain so it 
is irrelevant to this discussion. Rather, we wish to discuss the kind of pain that occurs 
with endurance exercise. This may include muscle soreness or a burning sensation in 
the lungs, the feeling that one’s heart will explode if the same level of intense effort is 
maintained much longer, and so forth. The strength of these sensations can range from 
unpleasant to what is typically thought of as unbearable pain. This second kind of pain 
is typical of endurance sports such as marathons, triathlon, long distance swimming 
and cycling, cross-country skiing, and so on. Among athletes, the former kind of pain 
is often referred to as a ‘bad’ kind, as it impairs the ability of the athlete to continue 
playing or competing, while the latter is referred to as a ‘good’ kind of pain, as it 
pushes the athlete to compete and perform at a higher level. Indeed, many athletes 
regard this second or ‘good kind’ of pain as an achievement and as an essential part of 
their life and identity as elite athletes.38  
 
The level of physical training of an athlete can raise the level of pain that he/she is 
able to endure, and make a difference in his/her performance. Athletes also report that 
the level of their ‘mental toughness’39 makes a difference in their ability to cope with 
pain. Different individuals, though, start from very different baselines in their abilities 
to endure pain,40 and this is one of the factors, among many other biological and 
environmental factors, that affect an athlete’s performance. Among these are: their 
birth place (contrast pre-athletic life at altitude and how this affects phenotypic factors 
with competitors born at or near sea level); wealth and other non-athletic factors that 
can enhance the possibilities of success (contrast athletes or teams with and without 
sports psychological services, or sponsorships that improve equipment access), 
genetic conditions that may confer an advantage over fellow athletes by increasing the 
amount of erythrocytes and oxygen supply to muscle cells (consider for example the 
case of Finnish skier Eero Mäntyranta who won two gold medals in cross-country 
skiing at the 1964 Winter Olympics. It was later discovered that he had primary 
familial and congenital polycythemia (PFCP), which causes an increase in red blood 
cell mass and haemoglobin due to a mutation in the erythropoietin receptor (EPOR) 
gene).41 
 
There is no absolutely agreed upon standard or trigger as to when sports 
administrators or regulatory bodies like WADA try to even out genetic and biological 
differences to reach a sufficiently ‘level playing field’ for all athletes: some 
inequalities are systematically excluded, while others are ignored.42 What happens in 
practice is that we do not usually try to level biological and genetic factors affecting 
athletic performance, even where we know those factors confer an advantage (as with 
Mäntyranta), although there is currently a controversy about new IAAF and IOC rules 
which exclude women athletes with hyperandrogenism from competing in women’s 
events on the basis of a supposed unfair advantage derived from increased levels of 
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testosterone.43 Typically, philosophers generally agree that the question centres 
around notions of fairness and equal opportunity, or what Loland calls Fair 
Opportunity.44  
 
Let us think counter-factually here: if we were to try to equalise all the starting 
conditions (of which tolerance to pain is, again, merely one example) we would move 
in the direction of having all athletes crossing the finish line at the same point, and 
then what would be left of the meaning of sport and athletic performance? After all 
we are precisely interested in distinguishing among excellent performers and 
performances. Only in certain circumstances, such as horse racing, do sports 
institutions initiate handicapping systems. And this, it might reasonably be argued, is 
to keep the competition tight and promote gambling interests. In other scenarios, 
where a league system – heavily underwritten by commercial media interests – has an 
incentive to prolong interests and more broadly spread opportunities to win, we find 
systems like the lower teams gaining access to the best new potential players in a draft 
system (such as in American Football). But in the main, we would not normally level 
out the effects of the genetic lottery in sports. If an athlete is 1 metre 40 we steer them 
away from high jump. If they are 2 metres tall, we do not encourage them to pursue a 
career as a professional jockey, and so on. Furthermore, a few US companies have 
started to sell online direct-to-consumer (DTC) genetic tests45 that aim to exploit the 
genetic lottery as early as possible, channelling children towards the most ‘profitable’ 
athletic future as predicted by the results of the tests. 
 
As mentioned above, different athletes have different baselines and different abilities 
to cope with pain. While we do try to give people tools better to cope with pain in 
everyday life, where pain is not – with certain noted exceptions - seen to be an 
essential or meaningful part of the activity we are performing, in the elite-sports 
context we do not give people those tools, because pain, as described above, is a 
fundamental part of practising and competing at an elite level.  
 
Pain can be distinguished from non-relevant inequalities, as for example the kind of 
shoes or swimsuits or bikes the athletes run, swim or cycle with, which do not impact 
upon the mental and physical qualities that are the source of our admiration for 
athletes and which are instrumental to the securing of victory. For these sorts of 
products, however,  we can and do insist upon degrees of standardisation. Thus, in 
baseball, cricket, or tennis there are regulations regarding the size and composition of 
the striking implement and the ball. Curiously, in Formula 1 racing there are prizes for 
both the best driver and the best constructors: the best supporting team of engineers 
and technologists. But even here there are strict rules about engineering variations. In 
European football, there are even suggestions that there should be financial fair play, 
so that team owners cannot “buy” victory by purchasing sufficiently large numbers of 
the talent pool.  
 
We cannot, however, ‘level-out’ the capacity for enduring pain in endurance events 
without usurping or compromising a key psychological variable inherent within the 
test. By levelling the ability to endure pain, we would also diminish a substantial part 
of the meaning of athletic performance, which can be understood as trying to break 
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one’s own limits given the starting conditions one has. That is why the toleration of 
pain qualifies as a relevant inequality that serves inter alia to demarcate athletic merit, 
and we consider that genetically based therapy for pain should not be permitted as it 
undermines the meaning of sport by interfering significantly with the relationship 
between natural talents, their virtuous perfection, and athletic success”.46 In other 
words, our view of the athlete’s capacity for pain tolerance could be seen a relevant 
inequality and essential for the meaning of competition. In the model developed by 
Loland and Hoppeler that combines a biologically based approach with a Fair 
Opportunity principle, the use of VEGF transfer could be understood as a way to go 
beyond human phenotypic plasticity47, and thus to go against the Fair Opportunity 
principle and the idea of the virtuous development of talent.48  
Conclusions 
The differences between the two scenarios we have presented are many and varied. 
We have focused only on the existence of a fundamental difference between a medical 
and an elite athletic context of VEGF-gene transfer to tolerate pain. In the latter the 
choice is fundamentally a self-regarding one, predicated on individual autonomy 
together with a risk/benefits calculation as the principal factor determining the ethics 
of that decision. A cautionary note must be struck here.  One must be mindful of the 
areas of uncertainty, the limited evidential base in relation to the experiment49 and its 
hoped-for outcomes in scientific and clinical terms. Nevertheless, in elite endurance 
sports contexts individual autonomy ceases to play the decisive role in the ethical 
analysis. Sports have traditionally incorporated paternalistic practices regarding the 
health of competitors but also the fairness of the structuring of competition in order to 
produce admirable victors. The context of gene-transfer matters for the evaluation of 
the ethical desirability or permissibility of the experimental practice we are analysing: 
while in an everyday life scenario, pain does not play a meaningful role (with some 
noted exceptions), pain does play a meaningful and constitutive role in endurance 
athletic competition, along with a range of other anatomical, physiological and 
psychological factors. By increasing the capacity for pain-tolerance, or even 
subtracting it altogether from the sports picture, we would inevitably subtract also a 
fundamental part of the meaning of that picture. 
 
We conclude, therefore, that while we would not interfere with the decision of Dr 
House to be enrolled in a trial for VEGF-gene transfer, we could not justify the 
request of the athlete seeking VEGF-gene transfer to increase his/her tolerance to 
pain. As a tool to cope with the intractable pain that visits afflicted patients, VEGF-
gene transfer is ethically justifiable and desirable. In endurance sports, the use of 
VEGF-gene transfer as an endurance enhancement technology is not merely ethically 
unjustifiable; it compromises an element essential to the activity itself. 
 
What does this comparison tell us about the relationship between the ethics of clinical 
research (scenario a) and the ethics of sports medicine (scenario b)? We might note 
that, while the field of clinical research ethics is more established and has a longer 
history, the field of ethics of sports medicine is a relatively young one, and reflects the 
underlying tension between the goals of medicine (health) and elite sports (athletic 
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excellence).50 But the ethics of first-in- human studies, including gene transfer studies, 
are still largely under-explored. Indeed, Kimmelman’s analysis of translational 
distance is the first and only attempt, to the best of our knowledge, to fill in the void 
left by the impossibility of applying the concept of clinical equipoise in first-in human 
gene transfer studies, which are characterised by a level of uncertainty that is simply 
too high (as we have shown above). Both fields are young and relatively under-
explored, and a comparison between the two may highlight insightful similarities, and 
shed light on problematic aspects of each.51 
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